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Abstract
The Giskard consensus protocol is used to validate transactions and computations in
the PlatON network. In this paper, we provide a rigorous specification of Giskard, suitable
to serve as a reference in protocol implementation and in formal verification. Using our
specification, we prove that the protocol guarantees several notable safety properties.
1 Introduction
The PlatON network provides a platform for distributed transactions and computations [6]. The
network relies on the Giskard consensus protocol [5] to reach agreement among participating
nodes regarding which blocks of transactions to add to a distributed ledger (blockchain). The
protocol tolerates that up to one third of all participating nodes are Byzantine, i.e., may behave
adversarially [4].
In this paper, we present a rigorous specification of Giskard. In contrast to the protocol
documentation [5], which gives an overview of the protocol and describes its general behavior,
our aim is to specify the protocol in sufficient detail to serve as a guide for implementation and
formal verification. To this end, we provide definitions of both protocol execution semantics and
important protocol properties, and present proofs of its three key safety properties based on
these definitions. Since our focus is on protocol safety, we elide discussion of higher-level features
of Giskard and only provide brief background; additional context and motivation can be found
in the official documentation [5].
2 Background
Fully asynchronous communication severely restricts the guarantees a consensus protocol can
provide [3]. Like the PBFT protocol [1], Giskard therefore assumes a partially synchronized
mesh network [2] which models the weak environment of public networks. This means that every
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network node is in principle able to communicate with every other node by message passing.
Similarly to the HotStuff potocol [7], Giskard separates production and confirmation of blocks,
and requires blocks to pass multiple stages before being confirmed as part to the blockchain.
3 Participating Nodes
Giskard is parameterized by a finite set N of participating nodes. These nodes can play two
roles in the protocol: block proposers and validators. Block proposers are responsible for both
producing new blocks and voting on blocks, while validators are only responsible for voting on
proposed blocks.
4 Epochs and Views
Giskard uses abstract units of time called epochs. The epoch changes once every 250 blocks [5].
More precisely, epochs are a measure of time and progress in the protocol tracked by each
participating node using an epoch number en that is defined based on its local state. For every
epoch i, an ordered list of k nodes Ni ⊂ N is selected to participate in epoch i by epoch i − 1,
using a Verifiable Random Function (VRF). For each participating node, an epoch is defined as
the duration of time required for 10 ∗ k blocks to reach local Prepare stage, 10 ∗ k − 1 blocks to
reach local Precommit stage, and 10 ∗ k − 2 blocks to reach local Commit stage. Consequently,
epoch change happens asynchronously among participating nodes and depends on the status of
their local blocks.
Epochs are further divided into views, tracked using a view number vn. Similar to epochs,
view number is defined for each participating node n based on its local state, and the protocol
does not guarantee that view change occurs at the same time for all participating nodes. Instead,
each participating node updates its local view number vn depending on its local state. There are
two ways in which a participating node can progress onto the next view:
• In the case of a normal view change: all 10 blocks produced by the block proposer reaches
quorum locally, or
• In the case of an abnormal view change, i.e. a timeout: system timeout occurs, and nodes
exchange messages and agree to increment their respective views. The timeout duration
for each view is computed by an algorithm, and is known upfront to all participating nodes.
Views demarcate the duration of time in which a unique participating node acts as block
proposer. Within each epoch, participating nodes from Ni take turns to act as block proposer.
Each epoch contains at least k views; each participating node acts as block proposer at least
once. If each participant n ∈ Ni has acted as block proposer once and fewer than 10 ∗ k blocks
reach global Prepare stage, the role of block proposer returns to the front of the list and continues
to rotate until 10 ∗ k blocks reach global Prepare stage, marking the end of the epoch.
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Definition 1 (Block proposer). Let Ni be the list of k participating nodes for epoch i. For node
n ∈ Ni with view vn = j, the block proposer for view j is Ni[j mod k], i.e., the (j mod k)-th
element of Ni.
One consequence of this definition is that if two participating nodes agree on the current view
number, they agree on the identity of the block proposer. Another consequence is that nodes
are always able to verify whether blocks are produced by the correct block proposer in a given
view. Therefore, Giskard precludes malicious behavior such as nodes impersonating the block
proposer and producing blocks out-of-turn, but does not preclude that the block proposer for a
given view behaves maliciously, by, e.g., producing two blocks of the same height.
5 Messages
Participating nodes communicate with one another by broadcasting messages over the network.
There are two kinds of messages: consensus messages and synchronization messages.
5.1 Consensus messages
Consensus messages are the primary mechanism through which Giskard achieves consensus, and
are used for block proposing, voting, and performing view changes. Consensus messages are
always broadcast to all participating nodes from the sender. There are five kinds of consen-
sus messages: PrepareBlock, PrepareVote, ViewChange, PrepareQC and ViewChangeQC. The
following basic data are included in all consensus messages:
e : the current epoch number
v : the current view number
n : the node index of the message sender
b_h : a block hash
b_n : the block number
b_i : the block index
sig : a Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) aggregate signature
The current epoch and view numbers indicate when the message was produced. Messages
are signed with the message sender’s unique identifier, which in addition to the BLS signature
allows the receiver to verify that message sender is authentic. As a convention, we use n in
place of Ni[n] to refer to the participating node in Ni with index n. All consensus messages
carry blocks, which are identifiable by their block hash. The block number refers to the height
of the block. The block index is view-specific and indicates the block’s position in the sequence
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of blocks produced in that view. Nodes can identify whether a block is the last block using the
block index: a block is the last block iff its index is 10.
Because Giskard’s safety properties primarily concern message blocks, views and senders, we
abbreviate messages as, e.g., PrepareBlock(b,v,n), omitting the remaining data fields.
In addition to the above basic data, consensus messages also contain aggregated BLS sig-
natures of other messages, and therefore can be interpreted as “carrying” other messages. The
different kinds of message carrying behavior and a discussion of their consequences follow.
PrepareBlock. PrepareBlock messages contain the following BLS signatures:
• ParentQC: the aggregated signature of quorum parent block PrepareVote messages,
• ViewChangeQC: the aggregated signature of quorum ViewChange messages.
Therefore, PrepareBlock(b,v,n) can be viewed as a triple of messages: PrepareBlock(b,v,n),
PrepareQC(parent(b),v’,n), and ViewChangeQC(b_max, v-1, n), where v′ ≤ v, parent(b) is
the parent block of b, and parent(b) received quorum votes in view v′.
However, it is important to note that since new proposers produce blocks in a “pipeline”
at the beginning of each view, i.e. one after another, the ParentQC field is somewhat of a
misnomer for most blocks: It cannot both be the case that all PrepareBlockmessages contain the
PrepareQC signature of their parent block aggregated from quorum PrepareVote messages, and
all PrepareBlock messages in a given view are produced at once, because the messages required
for the aggregate do not yet exist for any blocks except the first. Therefore, the ParentQC field
for all messages containing non-first blocks is effectively empty, i.e. set to a null placeholder.
Similarly, the ViewChangeQC field only contains the signature of a ViewChangeQC message
when the view change from v − 1 to v occurred via a timeout. In the case of a normal view
change from v− 1 to v, there are no ViewChangeQC or ViewChange messages broadcast amongst
nodes. A description of the view change process is contained in the section below.
PrepareVote. PrepareVote messages contain the following BLS signature:
• ParentQC: the aggregated signature of quorum parent block PrepareVote messages,
PrepareVote(b,v,n) can be interpreted as a pair of messages, namely, PrepareVote(b,v,n) and
PrepareQC(parent(b),v’, n), where v′ ≤ v, parent(b) is the parent block of b, and parent(b)
received quorum votes in view v′.
One consequence of PrepareVote’s message-carrying behavior is that if any node n receives
a PrepareVote(b,v,_), it can immediately reciprocate and send PrepareVote(b,v,n). This
is because the node “extracts” from the message a PrepareQC(parent(b),_,_) message, thus
satisfying the criterion that nodes can only vote for blocks whose parents have reached the
prepare stage.
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To push this consequence even further, it is not the case that nodes necessarily vote for
blocks in consecutive order, i.e. sending a PrepareVote(b,v,n) does not imply that n has sent
a PrepareVote(parent(b),v,n). This is illustrated in the example below.
Example 1. Let A, B, C and D be four nodes participating in the protocol, where blocks b1,
b2 and b3 have been proposed. A, B and C receive PrepareBlock messages for b1, and broadcast
PrepareVote messages for b1. A, B and C then receive one another’s PrepareVote messages for
b1, and respectively witness quorums for b1, broadcasting PrepareQC for b1 and PrepareVote
for b2. A receives PrepareVote(b2, B) and PrepareVote(b2, C) first, and alongside its own
PrepareVote(b2, A), it witnesses a quorum for b2 and broadcasts PrepareQC (b2, A). In the
case that D processes PrepareQC(b2, A) first, block b2 reaches prepare stage in D’s local state,
but b2’s parent block, b1, has not reached prepare stage in D’s local state, nor has D itself voted
for either b1 or b2.
However, it is the case that all blocks prior to bn must have reached prepare stage globally in
order for a participating to send PrepareVote(b_n,v,n), meaning that there must be evidence
in the global out message buffer witnessing their prepare stage status, either in the form of
quorum PrepareVote messages or a PrepareQC message. This illustrates that Giskard’s voting
criterion concerns what messages have been received, but not what messages have been sent.
ViewChange. ViewChange messages contain the following BLS signature:
• PrepareQC: the aggregated signature of quorum PrepareVote messages for the block con-
tained in the message.
ViewChange(max_b,v,n) can therefore be interpreted as a message pair ViewChange(max_b,v,n),
PrepareQC(max_b,v’,n). Note that as it is not guaranteed that max_b reached prepare stage in
the present view v, v’=v is not guaranteed.
In the following sections, we describe transmission of “carried” messages separately, for clarity.
6 States
Each node maintains its own ViewState s, i.e., a snapshot of the current protocol state. The
ViewState contains the following basic information:
e : the current epoch number
vn : the current view number
ni : the node’s unique identifier
lin : the input message buffer
lpending : the pending message buffer
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lcounting : the processed message buffer
lout : the output message buffer
tn : a local clock
The local clock is synchronized across all participating nodes.
7 Blocks
Participating nodes in Giskard ultimately aim to achieve distributed consensus on a blockchain,
namely a sequence of blocks containing domain-specific data, such as transactions. Each par-
ticipating node maintains their local version of the blockchain. Consensus means that each
participating node sees the same version of the blockchain, and consensus safety is stated in
terms of three node-local block properties: prepare stage, precommit stage and commit stage.
Definition 2 (Prepare stage in view). We say that block b is in prepare stage in view v for node
n, denoted PrepareinV iew(b, n, v), if
|{msg | msg ∈ lcounting ∧ ∃n ∈ Nv,msg = PrepareVote(b, n, v)}| ≥ 2/3 ∗ k
or ∃n ∈ Nv, PrepareQC(b, n, v) ∈ lcounting.
A block is in Prepare stage for some node in some view if the node has processed a quorum of
PrepareVote messages for that block sent in the view, or the node has processed a PrepareQC
message for that block sent in the view. For notational clarity in later proofs, we refer to the
first case as V oteQuorum(b, v, n) and the second case as QC(b, v, n).
Definition 3 (Prepare stage). We say that block b is in Prepare stage for node n, denoted
Prepare(b, n) if there exists a v′ such that v′ ≤ v and b is in Prepare stage for node n in view v,
where v denotes the node’s current view.
Definition 4 (Precommit stage). We say that block b is in Precommit stage for node n, denoted
Precommit(b, n) if block b is in Prepare stage and it has a child block that is also in Prepare
stage.
Definition 5 (Commit stage). We say that block b is in Commit stage for node n, denoted
Commit(b, n) if block b is in Precommit stage and it has a child block that is in Precommit
stage.
Sometimes, we need to refer to properties that refer to the global protocol state. We say
that a block is in global prepare (respectively, precommit and commit) stage if there exists a
participating node such that the block is in prepare (respectively, precommit and commit) stage
for that node.
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8 Fault Model
Giskard is fault-tolerant with respect to two kinds of faults: 1) non-Byzantine network errors
and 2) Byzantine node behavior. Some examples of faults of the latter kind are when a node:
• proposes more blocks than each view permits,
• proposes multiple blocks with the same height,
• votes for blocks whose PrepareBlock message has not been received, or
• votes for two blocks with the same height in the same view.
Giskard assumes that no more than one third of the participating nodes at any time in the
protocol are Byzantine.
9 Consensus Protocol
At a glance, participating nodes in Giskard process messages that are delivered to their input
buffers by the network, and broadcast messages to other nodes. Upon processing a message, the
participating node removes it from the input message buffer and adds it to the counting message
buffer. Upon sending a message, the participating node adds the message to its outgoing message
buffer. We first describe the block proposer’s actions, because they have special responsibilities
in each view. Protocol behavior of participating nodes depends on 1) whether the view has timed
out, and 2) whether the node is a block proposer. We describe behaviors of block proposers and
validators during non-timeout and timeout, respectively.
9.1 Non-timeout period
Block proposers. Upon entering a new view either through normal or abnormal view change,
the block proposer for the view broadcasts 10 PrepareBlock messages and one PrepareVote
message for the block contained in the first PrepareBlock message. The block contained in
the first PrepareBlock message is the child block of the carryover block from the previous
view. We postpone the definition of the carryover block until the end of this section. Each
PrepareBlock and PrepareVote message carries the PrepareQC message of the carryover block
from the previous view. Note that although PrepareBlock messages contain a field labeled
ParentQC, this name is only accurate for the first PrepareBlock message of each view. For
all other blocks, the field is more accurately named “GrandparentQC” or “AncestorQC” etc.
Furthermore, note that although all 10 block proposals occur sequentially and the production of
the latter 9 blocks do not depend on the prepare status of their parent, block voting does depend
on the prepare status of parent blocks.
After block proposal, the block proposer for the view behaves like a regular validator, per-
forming all of the validator actions described below.
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Validators. For every message received, the validator checks 1) block validity and 2) view
validity. Checking block validity involves executing the block, i.e. replaying each transaction in
the block, and verifying that the root hash of the state data is consistent with the block header.
Checking view validity involves checking that the message is signed by the same view number as
the local view number of the receiver. Validators do not process messages with invalid blocks,
nor do they process messages that were not produced in the current view. We include these two
checks implicitly in all of the message processing actions below, and therefore omit them from
the descriptions.
Validator nodes receive and process three kinds of messages during the normal period:
PrepareBlock, PrepareVote and PrepareQC.
PrepareBlock. Upon receiving PrepareBlock(b,i,v)message, validator j does the following:
• Check for the existence of a message containing a different block b′ with the same height
in lsb. In the case that such a block exists, discard the message.
• In the case that no message containing a block with the same height has been seen, Check
whether any of the following conditions hold:
– there exists v′ such that v′ ≤ v and a quorum of PrepareVote(b_parent,_,v’)
messages exist in lcounting,
– there exists v′ such that v′ ≤ v and a PrepareQC(b_parent,_,v’) message exists in
lcounting,
– PrepareBlock(b,i,v) contains the PrepareQC signature of bparent, where bparent is
the parent block of b.
If any of the above conditions hold, then broadcast (PrepareVote(b,j,v) and store it in
lout. If none of the above conditions hold, store (PrepareVote(b,j,v) in lpending.
PrepareVote. Upon receiving a PrepareVote(b,i,v) message, validator j does the following:
• First, check whether it has sent a PrepareVote(b,j,v) message. If it has not, send
PrepareVote(b,j,v).
• Next, determine whether it has seen enough votes for block b.
– If countb + 1 < N − f , increment countb := countb + 1.
– If countb + 1 = N − f , check whether b is the last block in the present view. If it is,
increment view number vn := vn+1 and broadcast PrepareQC(b, j,v). If not, check
for the existence of a PrepareVote(b_child,j,v) message in lpending, where bchild is
the child block of b. If such a message exists, send it and PrepareQC(b, j,v).
8
In the above, countb is the number of distinct PrepareVote(b,_,v) messages in lcounting.
Note that when processing PrepareVote messages, validators no longer need to check for the
existence of a PrepareVote message containing a different block of the same height.
PrepareQC. Upon receiving a PrepareQC(b,i,v) message, validator j does the following:
• First, check whether b is the last block in the present view. If it is, increment the view
number, vn := vn + 1.
• Second, if b is not the last block in the present view, check for the existence of a message
PrepareVote(b_child,j,v) in lpending, where bchild is the child block of b. If such a
message exists, send it.
As described above, a normal view change occurs when the last block proposed by the block
proposer reaches prepare stage in the current view, by either receiving the final PrepareVote
message required for quorum or a PrepareQC message. The maximum number of blocks proposed
during each view is common knowledge to all participating nodes, therefore nodes are always
able to identify the last block when they see it.
9.2 Timeout period
An abnormal view change occurs when the view expires and a timeout occurs before all proposed
blocks are able to enter prepare stage. Unlike normal view change, which depends on the node-
local blockchain, a timeout occurs simultaneously for each node because all node-local clocks are
synchronized.
Timeout duration calculation. The method for calculating the timeout duration is fixed
but unimportant to consensus safety; therefore, we include it as an appendix.
Once a node’s local view times out, it enters a liminal period in which only ViewChange,
ViewChangeQC and PrepareQC messages can be processed and sent. Current block proposers,
validators and to-be block proposers perform the same behaviors during this timeout period.
ViewChange. Upon timeout, node j does the following:
• Calculate the local highest prepare stage block bhighest, whereby bhighest is in prepare stage
for j, and for all b′ in prepare stage for j, height(b′) ≤ height(bhighest).
• Send ViewChange(b_highest,j,v).
• In the case that b_highest reached prepare stage in a past view v’, with v’ < v and
a PrepareQC(b_highest,_,v’) message or a quorum of PrepareVote(b_highest,_,v’)
messages exists in lcounting, send PrepareQC(b_highest,j,v’). In the case that b_highest
reached prepare stage in the current view v, send PrepareQC(b_highest,j,v).
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Upon receiving a ViewChange(b,i,v) message, node j does the following:
• Determine whether it has seen enough ViewChange messages for view v.
– If countv + 1 < N − f , increment countv := countv + 1.
– If countv+1 = N−f , increment view number vn := vn+1 and calculate the maximum
height block bmax of all the blocks contained in the quorum ViewChange messages,
then broadcast ViewChangeQC(b_max, j,v).
where countv is defined as the number of distinct ViewChange(b,_,v)messages in lcounting.
Note that from the definition of local prepare stage blocks, it is possible for the local highest
prepare stage block, and in turn, even the maximum height block, to have been produced and
voted upon in a past view.
ViewChangeQC. Upon receiving a ViewChangeQC(b_highest,i,v) message and its accom-
panying PrepareQC(b_highest,i,v), validator j does the following:
• Increment view number vn := vn + 1.
PrepareQC. Upon receiving a PrepareQC(b,i,v) message in the timeout period, validator j
does the following:
• Check whether b is the last block in the present view. If it is, increment countv := countv+1.
Participating nodes process PrepareQC messages in the timeout period, but do not cast votes.
Finally, we can define a carryover block as follows.
Definition 6 (Carryover block). A carryover block b for node n in view v is a bock such that:
b is the last block in v and b is in prepare stage
or ∃ ViewChangeQC(b,_, v) ∈ lcounting.
Synchronization mechanism. Giskard includes a synchronization mechanism which involves
nodes exchanging messages one-to-one, that allows nodes to update each other’s local blockchain.
Similar to the timeout duration calculation method, the synchronization mechanism is not im-
portant to consensus safety, and is therefore outlined in the appendix.
10 Safety Properties and Proofs
Safety intuitively states that the consensus protocol works as intended, i.e., that all participating
nodes reach a consensus on the global blockchain based on their local blockchains. More precisely,
we wish to show that any two same height blocks in Prepare stage in the same view, in Precommit
stage, or in Commit stage must be the same for all participating nodes.
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The first safety property states that no two blocks of the same height can be at Prepare stage
in the same view, i.e., Prepare stage block height is injective in the same view.
Theorem 1. For all n,m, b, b′, v, v′ such that PrepareinV iew(b, v, n) and PrepareinV iew(b′, v′,m),
if v = v′ and height(b) = height(b′), then b = b′.
Proof. Let 3f +1 be the number of participating nodes in the protocol. For the sake of yielding
a contradiction, assume that b 6= b′. We proceed by case analysis on PrepareinV iew(b, v, n),
PrepareinV iew(b′, v′,m):
• In the case that V oteQuorum(b, v, n), V oteQuorum(b′, v′,m): let V, V ′ be the set of par-
ticipating nodes that sent PrepareVote messages to n and m respectively. Because |V | ≥
2f +1, |V ′| ≥ 2f +1, by the pigeonhole principle, |V ∩V ′| ≥ 2∗ (2f +1)− (3f +1) = f +1.
Therefore, more than one third participating nodes voted for two different blocks of the
same height, and are malicious nodes. By assumption, there are no more than one third
participating nodes in the protocol that are malicious, therefore we reach a contradiction.
• In the case that V oteQuorum(b, v, n), QC(b′, v′,m), let m′ be the sender of the PrepareQC
message. Because m′ sent PrepareQC, it must be the case that V oteQuorum(b′, v′,m′).
Let V, V ′ be the set of participating nodes that sent PrepareVote messages to n and m
respectively. Following the above reasoning, we reach a contradiction.
• In the case that QC(b, v, n), V oteQuorum(b′, v′,m), we have a symmetric case to the above.
• In the case that QC(b, v, n), QC(b′, v′,m), let m,m′ be the senders of the PrepareQC mes-
sages respectively. Because m sent PrepareQC, we must have V oteQuorum(b, v,m). Sim-
ilarly, we have V oteQuorum(b′, v′,m′). Let V, V ′ be the set of participating nodes that
sent PrepareVote messages to m and m′ respectively. Following the above reasoning, we
reach a contradiction.
Therefore, because we reach a contradiction for all cases assuming b 6= b′, it must be the case
that b = b′.
While the first safety property only concerns the behavior of participating nodes and the
status of local blocks within a given view, the next safety property concerns blocks across all
views. The proofs of the second safety property, which states that no two blocks of the same
height can be at Precommit stage, i.e., Precommit stage block height is injective, critically
relies on the relationship between view number and block height, for a given node. Before
giving a characterization of this relationship for an arbitrary number of views, we first look at
the relationship between two consecutive views to provide some intuition. We first define the
following kind of special block.
Definition 7. (Highest Prepare block) For some view v, we say that b is the highest Prepare
block in v, denoted HighestPrepareBlock(b, v), iff
∃ m. Prepare(b, v,m) ∧ ∀ b′, n. Prepare(b′, v, n) =⇒ height(b′) ≤ height(b).
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In other words, the highest Prepare block in a view is the highest block at Prepare stage for
some participating node in the epoch. Note that because the definition uses Prepare and not
PrepareinV iew, the highest Prepare block in a view may not necessarily have been voted for in
that view itself. We denote the height of such a block as MaxHeight(v).
In Section 4, we described two kinds of view change: normal and abnormal, or timeout. Next,
we characterize these two kinds of view change, with attention to the height of local Prepare
stage blocks.
Lemma 1 (Abnormal view change block height). For every ViewChangeQC(b,v,_) message,
b is either the highest Prepare block in v or the second highest Prepare block in view v, i.e.,
height(b) =MaxHeight(v) ∨ height(b) =MaxHeight(v)− 1.
Proof. Suppose HighestPrepareBlock(b, v) for view v, and MaxHeight(v) = height(b). By
definition of HighestPrepareBlock, there exists some node n such that Prepare(b, v, n). By
definition of Prepare stage, we know that at least 2/3 participating nodes cast votes for b. By
the voting rules we know that nodes can only vote for blocks whose parent block has reached
Prepare stage locally. Let b′ be the parent block of b, therefore, b′ is at Prepare stage for at least
2/3 participating nodes, and the local highest Prepare block for these nodes must have height
at least height(b′) = height(b) − 1. By the pigeonhole principle, any quorum of ViewChange
messages containing nodes’ local highest Prepare blocks must contain at least 1/3 messages
containing a block at least height height(b′). Therefore, the aggregated maximum height block
from any quorum of ViewChange messages must be height at least height(b′) = height(b)− 1 =
MaxHeight(v)− 1.
Intuitively, Lemma 1 is true because global Prepare stage does not mean local Prepare stage
for more majority nodes. We can thus split the abnormal or timeout view change case into two
cases based on the height of the block contained in the ViewChangeQC message, making three
cases in total. We use an example to depict the local blockchains corresponding to the three
view change cases in Figure 1. Blocks are named according to their block proposer and height,
and we conventionally refer to the view in which node A is block proposer as view A. Blocks
depicted are blocks in Prepare stage in view for a particular participating node.
Example 2. Let A be a participating node whose current view number is 1. Let B be the
block proposer for view 1 and C be the block proposer for view 2. Suppose that three blocks
are produced in each view, such that a total of three blocks have been produced thus far: bB1 ,
bB2 , and bB3 . According to the two view change scenarios described in Section 4, there are two
possibilities for when A will perform a view change and update its local view number to 2:
• All three blocks have reached Prepare stage in A’s current view, and A performs a view
change automatically,
• A timeout occurs and fewer than three blocks have reached Prepare stage, and A receives
a ViewChangeQC message.
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B C
bB1
bB2
bB3
bC4
(a) Case 1: Normal
B C
bB1
bB2 b
C
2
(b) Case 2: Timeout with sec-
ond highest block aggregated
B C
bB1
bB2
bC3
(c) Case 3: Timeout with high-
est block aggregated
Figure 1: Three view change cases.
We can now state the following fact on heights of Prepare stage blocks in consecutive views.
Lemma 2 (Consecutive view Prepare stage block height). For all n,m, b, b′, v such that
PrepareinV iew(b, v, n), PrepareinV iew(b′, v + 1,m), then height(b) ≤ height(b′).
This result should be generalizable to an arbitrary number of view changes. A rigorous
proof of this generalization requires considering some additional cases. For example, it is not
guaranteed that every view has Prepare stage blocks in that view. The local blockchain in such
an example is given in Figure 2 below, in which no blocks reached Prepare stage in view C, so
the block proposer for the next view, D, proposed blocks based on bB2 .
B C D
bB1
bB2
bD3
Figure 2: Case with no Prepare stage blocks in the view of block proposer C.
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By induction on the view number, we should now be able to prove the following fact about
the height of blocks.
Lemma 3 (View number and Prepare stage block height). For all n,m, b, b′, v, v′ such that
PrepareinV iew(b, v, n), if PrepareinV iew(b′, v′,m) and v ≤ v′, then height(b) ≤ height(b′).
Intuitively, if every view change is either a normal view change or an abnormal view change
where the carryover block is the highest Prepare block in the view, then we can strengthen the ≤
relation in the lemma above to <. Only abnormal view change cases where the carryover block
is the second highest Prepare block in the view allow for two Prepare stage blocks of the same
height in different views, as illustrated in Case 2 of Figure 1. Therefore, we should be able to
specialize the lemma above to the following.
Lemma 4 (Different view Prepare stage block height). For all n,m, b, b′, v, v′ such that we have
PrepareinV iew(b, v, n), PrepareinV iew(b′, v′,m), height(b) = height(b′) and v < v′, then b
must be the highest Prepare block in v and b′ must be the first (equivalently, lowest) Prepare
block in v′.
We give an informal proof of Precommit stage safety based on the above lemmas.
Theorem 2. For all n,m, b, b′ such that Precommit(b, n) and Precommit(b′,m), if height(b) =
height(b′), then b = b′.
Proof. By definition of Precommit stage, we know that b and b′ are in local Prepare stage for n
and m. Let v and v′ be the views during which b and b′ received enough votes, respectively, such
that PrepareinV iew(b, v′, n) and PrepareinV iew(b′, v′,m). By Lemma 4, because height(b) =
height(b′), we know that b must be the last block in view v, and b′ must be the first block in view
v′. By definition of Precommit stage, b must have a child block (that is also at Prepare stage).
However, because there exists a block of the same height as b in a different view, namely b′, the
view change from v must have occurred via an abnormal timeout where the second highest block
from v was aggregated in the ViewChangeQC message. Therefore, no child blocks of b can exist,
because the next Prepare stage block following the view change will be a child of b’s parent block.
This reasoning applies for all following Prepare stage blocks, yielding a contradiction.
Finally, the proof of the third and final safety property stating that Commit stage block
height is injective is direct from Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. For all n,m, b, b′ such that Commit(b, n) and Commit(b′,m), if height(b) =
height(b′), then b = b′.
Proof. By the definition of Commit, we can directly apply Theorem 2.
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11 Conclusion
We provided a rigorous specification of the Giskard consensus protocol, and formulated and
proved several of its key safety properties. Our specification can serve as a reference when
implementing and formally verifying Giskard. Reasoning about other classes of properties besides
safety, notably liveness, is an interesting avenue of future work.
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1. ViewTimeout Calculation  
PlatON system has below parameters for ViewTimeout calculation  
1. baseTime is the minimum time for View timeout, has fixed value of 10 seconds
2. exponentBase has fixed value of 1.5
3. exponent is the power of exponentBase, it will be adjusted accordingly based on rules 
descripted below. ( domain:  0 <= exponent << maxExpoent, where maxExponent is 2.)
The calculation formula  
ViewTimeout = baseTime * exponentBase ^ exponent
Within above formula, the only variable changing is exponent which will be calculated in TWO 
rounds based on following rules
The timing when Calculation happens  
ViewTimeout calculation triggered by ViewChange when system switching from View X (last View) 
to View X+1 (current View) 
Variables declaration:  
maxBlock : Maximum number of blocks can be proposed per View, fixed value is 10.
confirmedBlock : The number of blocks reached QCs of last View
currentViewNumber : Current View number
lastConfirmedBlockViewNumber : View number had the highest QC block
previousExponent : exponent value calculated by last View
First round of calculation  
1. If there is at least one block got confirmed in the last View, 
exponent = (maxBlock-confirmedBlock) / 3 
2. If there is NO block confirmed in the last View
exponent = currentViewNumber-lastConfirmedBlockViewNumber
Second round of calculation  
1. If previousExponent > exponent, then exponent = previousExponent - 1
2. If previousExponent == exponent , then exponent = previousExponent + 1
The timeout mainly solves the impact of network jitter in the distributed system. The first 
calculation is to determine the block condition of the view so as to set exponent. The second 
calculation is to control the timeout by  gradually decrease or increase the exponent, to avoid the 
drastic volatile change of the timeout time.
2. Synchronization mechanism 
Each node will periodically broadcast messages based on local status, in order to keep status in 
sync with other nodes in the network quickly. Message types:
1. Status message of current node
This messages contains (QCBlock, LockBlock, ViewChangeQC). If other nodes receive this 
message and find that their local state is out of date, then that node needs to request block 
information or ViewChangeQC from the node who sent this message. Otherwise, ignore the 
message.
2. Synchronization of PrepareVote
Due to network conditions, the nodes may not receive the PrepareVote of the current view in 
time, then the nodes themselves will periodically synchronize the PrepareVote of the current view 
for those unconfirmed blocks. Synchronization request messages are broadcasted to some 
nodes randomly.
3. Synchronization of ViewChange
In the case of ViewChange, each node may not receive enough N-f ViewChange. Validators can 
quickly switch to the new by synchronizing ViewChange. The synchronization messages are 
broadcasted to some nodes randomly.
3. Epoch, ViewNumber
Each Epoch, ViewNumber starts from 0, increase by 1 each time.
